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Abstract 
Employing a panel dataset of bilateral inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) for 
31 Asian countries and territories over the period 2001-2012, we estimate the knowledge-
capital (KK) model to find the dominant type of FDI within Asia. We consider alternative 
estimation methods to deal with zero values, which form the majority of the bilateral 
observations. Based on a series of model selection and diagnostic tests, we conclude that 
Lognormal Hurdle and Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood are the most appropriate. 
Controlling for host and source country characteristics, our findings suggest that vertical FDI 
is the dominant type between Asian countries. However, we find little empirical evidence in 
support of the KK model’s predictions for its key variables, such as total GDP and skill 
difference, when country fixed effects are included. Some factors (distance, trade costs to both 
source and host country, the GDP difference between source and host country, and a common 
spoken language) are found to have statistically significant impacts on the volume of FDI 
between Asian countries, regardless of whether or not fixed effects are included. 
 
Keywords: Intra-Asian FDI, knowledge-capital model, corner solution outcomes, zero values, 
skill differences 




Anh Nguyen  ngocanhnguyen2312@gmail.com 
 
Murat Genç   murat.genc@otago.ac.nz  
 
Alfred Haug   alfred.haug@oyago.ac.nz  
 





Global foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown rapidly since the 1990s. Although the 
European Union is the largest host and source of the total FDI stock in the world, Asia has 
gained more attention from foreign investors in recent years. According to the World 
Investment Reports (UNCTAD, 2015, 2016), Asia has attracted more than 400 billion dollars 
of FDI inflows each year since 2012, comprising around a third of global FDI. As Figure 1 
demonstrates, a significant amount of FDI to Asia comes from other Asian countries. 
Intraregional investments account for nearly 50% of total FDI in Asia from 2001 to 2012. In 
addition, 53% of announced greenfield projects in Asia (by value in 2015) involved intra-Asian 
investment (UNCTAD, 2016). There have been numerous empirical studies on FDI in Asia but 
only a few examine intraregional Asian FDI, e.g., Kim and Oh (2007), Hattari and Rajan 
(2008), Rajan and Hattari (2009), Petri (2012), Masron (2013) and Garrett (2016). Moreover, 
these studies focus on only a relatively small number of Asian countries and/or only a specific 
region, such as East Asia and Southeast Asia. Our research contributes to the literature by 
studying the drivers of intra-Asian FDI, using a much more comprehensive data set that 
includes 31 Asian countries and territories, from 2001 to 2012. 
Two popular motives for FDI are to serve foreign markets and to take advantage of lower 
input costs in foreign nations. This leads to the two main types of FDI: horizontal FDI and 
vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI occurs when multinational enterprises (MNEs) produce the same 
goods and services in multiple countries in order to expand their markets. In contrast, vertical 
FDI occurs when MNEs fragment their production process vertically between source and host 
nations to benefit from lower production costs. Markusen’s (2002) knowledge-capital (KK) 
model integrates both these motives into a general equilibrium model that can explain both 
horizontal and vertical FDI simultaneously. Empirical evidence based on the KK model, so far, 
suggests that horizontal FDI is more prevalent than vertical FDI. Ours is the first study that 
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applies the KK model to investigate the determinants of intra-Asian FDI in order to determine 
whether the dominant type of FDI is horizontal, vertical or mixed. With the KK model as a 
framework, our regression analysis also takes into account the effect of both source and host 
countries’ characteristics. 
The majority of observed values of bilateral FDI are zeros, as is the case for trade data. 
The KK model not only predicts the volume of FDI but also whether there is no FDI, i.e., if 
domestic investment is the dominant type. However, empirical applications of the KK model 
tend to ignore the no-FDI outcome and, instead, focus on the two types of FDI – horizontal or 
vertical. In our study, we apply the KK model to bilateral FDI between all possible in-sample 
country pairs to test the model predictions on both FDI and no FDI. This requires estimation 
methods that can deal with zero outcomes. Several alternative econometric estimation methods 
have been suggested in the literature, based on different underlying assumptions about the 
unknown data generating process.  Empirical studies of FDI commonly select and apply a 
specific method without exploring whether it is superior to other available alternative methods. 
In contrast, we conduct statistical testing to choose the most appropriate estimator for our data. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
literature on the KK model as well as determinants of intra-Asian FDI. Section 3 describes the 
empirical model. Data definitions and sources are documented in Section 4, followed, in 
Section 5, by a discussion of the econometric methods used. Section 6 reports and discusses 
the regression results. Section 7 conducts a variety of robustness checks, followed by our 
conclusions in Section 8.   
 
2. Literature review 
Sizeable outward FDI from Asia commenced when Japanese MNEs shifted their 
production to other Asian nations in response to the 60% appreciation of the Yen beginning in 
1985 (Thorbecke & Salike, 2013). Most studies on FDI in Asia focus on a major source 
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country, such as Japan (Encarnation, 1999; Lakhera, 2008), Taiwan (Chen & Aquino, 1998), 
or China (Kang & Jiang, 2012).  
There are very few studies specifically examining FDI between Asian countries. For 
example, Kim and Oh (2007) employ aggregate data on Asian FDI flows between 13 East and 
Southeast Asian countries, from 1995 to 2004, to analyse the effects of regional economic 
integration on intra-regional FDI. Hattari and Rajan (2008) and Rajan and Hattari (2009) 
examine the determinants of intra-Asia bilateral FDI, using a gravity framework, a dataset 
including 14 host countries and 10 source countries between 1990 and 2005, and the same 
empirical method (Tobit regression). Besides standard gravity variables, GDP and distance, 
each of these studies augments the regression analysis with several additional covariates. They 
find statistically significant influences of exports, common language, exchange rates, stock 
market capitalisation, financial openness, corporate tax, political risk, and free trade 
agreements on bilateral FDI between developing economies in Asia. Petri (2012) analyses 
bilateral FDI flows between 85 countries over the period between 1998 and 2003, with dummy 
variables for intra-Asian factors for 16 Asian countries. Using a gravity modelling approach 
and censored Tobit regression, he finds that intraregional FDI in Asia, in contrast to global 
FDI, is attracted by host countries with low technology achievements and good protection of 
intellectual property rights.1  
Based on Dunning’s (1977) ‘eclectic’ or ‘OLI’ (Ownership, Location, and Internalization) 
framework, Masron (2013) examines the role of the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and the 
ASEAN free trade agreement (AFTA) in promoting intra-ASEAN FDI during the period from 
1998 to 2009. The results reveal that factors encouraging intra-ASEAN FDI in the AIA are the 
host country’s GDP, political stability, labour productivity, and non-ASEAN FDI.  
                                                          
1 Population is used as a proxy for market size, although it does not capture the purchasing power of an economy 
as a whole as well as GDP. 
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In an investigation of bilateral FDI flows between 101 countries over the period 1995-
2002, Garrett (2016) also analyses determinants of intraregional FDI between a sub-group of 
14 Asian countries. Comparing results from two different estimation methods (ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and Heckman selection), he finds (Appendix 7) that, for intra-Asian FDI, 
belonging to the same regional trade agreement has a negative effect on the probability of 
entering an FDI relationship but a positive effect on FDI flows if FDI takes place. In addition, 
larger host countries are more likely to attract non-zero FDI, but host country size has a 
negative impact on FDI flows if FDI takes place.  
Our study extends the empirical literature on the determinants of intra-Asia FDI in a 
number of ways. First, we examine intra-Asia FDI as a whole rather than focusing on only a 
small sub-group of Asian countries. Second, in addition to considering host-country 
characteristics, we also include in our analysis the source countries’ characteristics, such as 
factor endowments, as the latter may have a significant effect on FDI location choices.2 Third, 
unlike most previous studies on Asian FDI, we base the choice of variables in our empirical 
model on the KK theory as much as possible. Fourth, we conduct model selection tests in order 
to find the most appropriate estimator and do not rely solely on one econometric method when 
alternative suitable methods are available.  
 
3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
Numerous explanations of the existence of MNEs and FDI have been developed over time, 
emphasizing ownership advantages, internalization, diversified FDI, knowledge capital, 
export-platform FDI, and others (Faeth, 2009). The KK model developed by Markusen (2002) 
is used as the basis for our empirical work because it can explain both horizontal and vertical 
                                                          




FDI simultaneously in a general equilibrium framework, taking into account both source and 
host countries’ characteristics.  
The KK model is built around the key idea that there are knowledge-based assets 
generating firm-level scale economies. These knowledge-based assets, which are referred to as 
knowledge-capital, involve research and development activities, patents, human capital, 
organizational structures, managerial skills, etc. Based on a 2×2×2 model with two countries 
(home and foreign), two inputs (skilled and unskilled labour), and two outputs (homogeneous 
product and differentiated product), the model predicts the impacts of country size, distance, 
trade costs, investment costs, labour endowments, and the interaction between these factors on 
different types of firms (horizontal MNEs, vertical MNEs, or domestic firms) in equilibrium. 
Even though most predictions of the KK model are derived from numerical simulation results, 
it does generate a number of empirically testable implications relating FDI to country 
characteristics. Table 1 summarizes the relationship between host and source countries’ 
characteristics and types of investment. 
The complexity of the KK model, incorporating nonlinear and non-monotonic 
relationships, allows considerable latitude in formulating an empirical estimation equation 
(Carr, Markusen, & Maskus, 2003). The most influential empirical study of the KK model is 
Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001), referred to as the CMM specification, as can be seen from 
Table A1 in the Appendix. Therefore, we base our estimation equation on their specification:  
 
FDI = f(SumGDP, GDPdif_sq, GDPSK, SKdif, Tradecost_s, Tradecost_h, TradeSK, 
Investcost_h, Dist, GDPdif, BIT, Contig, ComLang, ComCol)      (1)
 
 
where suffix s denotes the source/parent country and suffix h denotes the host/receiving 
country. FDI is the annual FDI stock accrued due to flows from country s to country h. 
Variables with no s or h suffix are pair-specific. 
6 
 
The KK model encompasses both horizontal and vertical FDI. For some variables, the 
effects on these two types of FDI are hypothesized to have the same sign, whereas for other 
variables the effects can have opposite signs, and some effects are expected to be 
(approximately) zero. Simulation results from Markusen (2002) show that the combined 
income of the country pair, measured by the sum of their real GDP levels (SumGDP = GDP_s 
+ GDP_h), encourages horizontal FDI. By contrast, horizontal FDI is hypothesized to have an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with differences in income, with horizontal FDI maximized, 
other things equal, when the two countries are similar in market size (Carr et al., 2001). 
Therefore, the square of the difference in GDP levels, GDPdif_sq = (GDP_s – GDP_h)2, is 
expected to have a negative effect on horizontal FDI. However, when controlling for 
differences in factor endowments, SumGDP and GDPdif_sq are not expected to have any 
impact on vertical FDI (Markusen & Maskus, 2002). 
Whereas horizontal FDI is encouraged when two countries are similar in factor 
endowments, vertical FDI is expected to be larger when the source country is more skilled-
labour abundant than the host country (Carr et al., 2001). Therefore, the difference in skilled-
labour endowments (SKdif = SK_s  SK_h, where SK is skilled-labour endowment) is a key 
variable in determining the dominant type of FDI. The marginal effect of differences in skilled-
labour endowments on vertical FDI is maximized when the source country is small (Carr et al., 
2001). Therefore, the interaction between differences in country size and skilled-labour 
endowments (GDPSK = (GDP_s GDP_h)  (SK_s  SK_h)) is expected to have a negative 
influence on vertical FDI, but no effect on horizontal FDI.  
Trade costs to the source country (Tradecost_s) hinder vertical FDI because they are a 
disincentive to produce in host countries and export back to the source countries (Carr et al., 
2001). Higher trade costs to the source country are hypothesized to have a negative impact on 
this process. Markusen and Maskus (2002) suggest that higher inward source-country trade 
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costs will also negatively affect horizontal FDI, although the effect on this type of FDI may be 
less important.  
Markusen and Maskus (2002) predict that trade costs to the host country (Tradecost_h) 
have a positive effect on horizontal FDI. The main motive for firms to invest horizontally 
abroad is to gain better access to the host country market, to avoid trade barriers, and to lower 
transportation costs. Consequently, higher trade costs to the host countries motivate horizontal 
FDI as a substitute for trade. Markusen and Maskus (2002) suggest trade costs to the host 
country possibly have a positive but smaller magnitude effect on vertical FDI. However, 
vertical FDI firms often have to import materials or other inputs for their production process in 
host countries; higher trade costs to the host countries would deter this form of investment. 
Therefore, we expect higher trade costs to the host country to encourage horizontal FDI but, 
on balance, discourage vertical FDI. 
Besides variables that affect only one of the two FDI types or affect both in opposite 
directions, there are general determinants of FDI that are expected to have a common influence 
on both types. First, both horizontal and vertical FDI are negatively related to the interaction 
between trade costs to the host country and the square of skill difference (TradeSK = 
Tradecost_h  (SK_s – SK_h)2) (Carr et al., 2001). As noted, host country trade costs have a 
positive impact on horizontal FDI but a negative impact on vertical FDI. Meanwhile, horizontal 
FDI is most significant when two countries have similar endowments, the opposite to the case 
of vertical FDI. Therefore, this interaction term is included to moderate the direct effect of 
trade costs and it negatively affects both types of FDI. Theoretically, simulation results in 
Markusen (2002) show that the effect of host-country trade costs is highest when the source 
country is moderately skilled-labour abundant, not when it has exactly the same endowment as 
the host country. Empirically, previous papers often find weak or conflicting evidence for this 
interaction effect (Carr et al., 2001; Davies, 2008; Markusen, 2002). 
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In general, investment costs in the host country (Investcost_h) deter FDI. However, 
distance (Dist) can be a measure of either trade costs or investment costs. Often when the 
destination country is further away, investment costs related to monitoring and managing the 
affiliates are expected to be higher, which deters both types of FDI. However, if distance is 
regarded as a proxy for trade costs it would have a positive impact on horizontal FDI as firms 
may use FDI to replace exports to eliminate significant trade costs. The effects of distance on 
both forms of FDI are indistinguishable. 
Besides basic KK variables from the Carr et al. (2001) model, which have been included 
in numerous empirical studies, we augment our model specification with a number of 
additional explanatory variables. First, we add the difference in GDP (GDPdif = (GDP_s  
GDP_h)). The inverted U-shaped relationship between GDPdif and horizontal FDI is captured 
by the square of GDP difference and the interaction between GDPdif and skilled-labour 
endowments is also included (as GDPSK). However, to reduce the possibility of biased 
estimates, it is advisable to include all constituent terms in interaction variables separately in 
the model specification (Balli & Sorensen, 2013; Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). Consistent 
with classical economic theory, capital should flow from rich countries to poor countries due 
to diminishing returns to capital. Hence, the GDP difference may have a positive impact on 
both types of FDI. However, the Lucas Paradox (Lucas, 1990) highlights that there is little 
capital flowing from rich countries to poor countries; the vast majority of capital flows are 
actually between developed or rich countries. If FDI between Asian countries is consistent with 
the Lucas Paradox, GDP differences may have a negative impact on FDI.  
Additionally, we include in the estimation equation four dummies that are found to have a 
significant impact on FDI in previous studies: existence of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), 
contiguity (Contig), common spoken language (ComLang), and common colonizer post 1945 
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(ComCol).3 These variables are expected to reduce investment costs between two countries and 
thus have a positive impact on FDI in general. We include a dummy variable for having a 
common spoken language; this encompasses having a common official language, which has 
been more widely used in the literature. The set of non-official languages in which people 
between the two countries are proficient can reduce transaction costs in business between them 
(Kim, Liu, Tuxhorn, Brown, & Leblang, 2015). In the Centre d'Études Prospectives et 
d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) database, common spoken language takes on a value of 
1 if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both countries. Variable 
explanations and expected signs for horizontal (HOR) and vertical (VER) FDI are summarized 
in Table 2. The basic KK variables are separated from the additional variables by a horizontal 
line in each table of results. 
 
4. Data 
The sample includes data for 31 Asian countries and territories, for the years 2001 to 2012. 
This is based on an initial list of all countries and territories geographically located in Asia 
according to the United Nations.4 From this, we exclude countries that are considered European 
according to the European Union.5 We end up with 31 countries and territories with sufficient 
data for the empirical analysis. 
There are 930 directional pairs or 465 non-directional pairs, giving a maximum possible 
number of observations of 11,160. FDI stock data are from the UNCTAD database. Primarily 
these are inward stock data for the host country, but, for any pair of countries, if the source 
country provides more observations, outward stock data from the source country are used. This 
maximises the number of bilateral observations and provides consistent reporting for each 
                                                          
3 Other dummies are used in previous studies such as: ever in a colonial relationship, currently in a colonial 
relationship, and in a colonial relationship post 1945. However, almost all possible pairs between the 31 Asian 
countries in our study have never had a colonial relationship, so colonial dummies are not included. 
4 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/, accessed on 1st May 2016. 
5 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en, accessed on 1st May 2016.  
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country pair. Data for GDP are from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). The WDI 
database does not provide data for Taiwan, so we obtain data for Taiwan from the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook Database, 2017 edition. Monetary variables, i.e., GDP and FDI, are real 
values in constant 2010 US dollars. Nominal FDI is deflated by the ratio between nominal GDP 
and real GDP for the reporting country, which acts as an implicit deflator for the FDI data. Due 
to data availability, the main proxy for skilled-labour endowments is the percentage of the 
population that enrols in tertiary education. We also use the ratio of the workforce that is skilled 
(skill ratio) in robustness checks. The skilled jobs group includes managers, professionals, 
technicians and associate professionals, according to the categorization of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). Investment costs and trade costs are calculated as 100 minus the 
investment freedom index and 100 minus the trade freedom index, respectively. Data sources 
are described in Table 3. 
 
5. Estimation methods and model selection tests 
The dependent variable in our model is the stock of bilateral FDI between all possible pairs 
of countries and territories in Asia. Inspecting the FDI data shows that around 70% of Asian 
country pairs do not send FDI to one another. The majority of observations on the dependent 
variable therefore take the value of zero. A common problem in the international trade and FDI 
literature is how to deal with these zeros in estimation. The tendency in the literature is to 
estimate a Heckman sample selection model. However, we do not face missing data here. The 
zeros are true zeros, i.e., corner solution outcomes. A corner solution response model 
(Wooldridge, 2010), rather than a sample selection model, is therefore more appropriate. 
We assume that the observed values of FDI are the outcomes of a maximization problem 
that allows the possibility of corner solutions at zero. We can express this as: 
 
FDI = max(0, xβ + ε) (2) 
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where x is the row vector of covariates in our model, β a vector of parameters, and ε a generic 
error term. This can be written as a latent variable model: 
 
FDI* = xβ + ε 
FDI = max(0, FDI*) 
 
where FDI* is a latent variable. These equations combine the mechanisms that describe the 
participation decision (FDI = 0 versus FDI > 0) and the amount decision (the magnitude of 
FDI if FDI > 0). Equation (2), with the assumption that ε|x ~ N(0, σ2), is labelled the ‘Type I 
Tobit model’ by Wooldridge (2010, Ch. 17), and is the standard Tobit model widely applied in 
the literature. However, violation of this distributional assumption (due to heteroskedasticity 
or non-normality) makes the Tobit estimator inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2010). 
A more flexible approach is to assume that the mechanisms determining the participation 
decision and the amount decision are separate; this gives rise to two-part (or hurdle) models 
(Wooldridge, 2010, Section 17.6). We consider two types of two-part model (proposed by 
Cragg (1971)): the truncated normal hurdle (TNH) model and the lognormal hurdle (LH) 
model. The different model types correspond to different distributional assumptions for FDI*, 
i.e., a truncated normal distribution and a lognormal distribution, respectively. In both models, 
the participation decision, reflected in the probability of observing positive FDI, is determined 
by a probit model. By contrast, the amount decision for each model is: 
 
FDI* = xβ + ε (TNH model) (3) 
FDI* = exp(xβ + ε)   or   log(FDI*) = xβ + ε (LH model) (4) 
 
In the amount equation for the TNH model in (3),  given x is assumed to have a truncated 
normal distribution and the parameters are estimated by a truncated normal regression. In the 
amount equation for the LH model in (4),  given x is assumed to be normally distributed, so 
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FDI* has a lognormal distribution and the model for log(FDI*) is estimated by OLS. 
Wooldridge (2010, p. 701) suggests using a likelihood ratio (LR) test to choose between the 
type I Tobit and TNH models, provided the Tobit model is not rejected by violating normality 
or homoskedasticity assumptions.  
The TNH and LH models assume independence between the participation and amount 
decisions. Relaxing this assumption gives what Wooldridge (2010) calls the ‘exponential type 
II Tobit (ET2T) model’. Assume FDI = s · FDI*, where s is a binary variable determining 
whether FDI is zero (s = 0) or positive (s = 1). The participation part, s, of ET2T is determined 
by a probit model, as for TNH and LH, and the amount equation is of the same form as for LH 
in equation (4). However, unlike LH, the errors in the probit model, v, and in the LH-type 
amount equation, , are allowed to be correlated. Wooldridge (2010, pp. 698-699) shows that 
 
E[log(FDI*)x, FDI > 0] = xβ + λ(xγ)  
 
where λ(.) is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the probit estimation of the participation 
equation (with parameters ) and  is the population regression coefficient from the error in 
the amount equation, , on the error in the participation equation, v. The LH model is nested in 
ET2T, because ET2T reduces to the LH model when the correlation of the errors in the 
participation and outcome equations equals zero ( = 0). An LR test can be applied to choose 
the appropriate model.  
Lastly, the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimation proposed by Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) has been frequently employed to deal with corner solution outcomes 
for a continuous dependent variable. The equation to be estimated by PPML is: 
 




For PPML to be consistent the conditional mean must be correctly specified, which can be 
tested using the Ramsey RESET test. In addition, Santos Silva, Tenreyro, and Windmeijer 
(2015) propose the HPC test, which can be used to discriminate between one-part models and 
two-part models for corner-solution data.6  
 
6. Regression results and interpretation 
We estimate the parameters of the model in (1) using the different possible methods for 
dealing with corner solution outcomes discussed in the previous section. We exclude bilateral 
FDI between China and Hong Kong in the empirical analysis because FDI between this pair is 
considerably larger (nearly ten times larger) than FDI between any other pair in the sample.7 
Even without the China – Hong Kong pair, one of the estimation methods, TNH, does not 
converge; consequently, we report results for Tobit, LH, ET2T, and PPML.  
The conditional moment (CM) test of normality of the errors for Tobit (Skeels & Vella, 
1999) shows that this assumption is not met in the data (CM = 213.51; p-value = 0.000, which 
rejects the null hypothesis of normality). Therefore, estimates from Tobit are inconsistent. We 
also present results from OLS for comparison with previous studies, although OLS is not an 
appropriate method as it does not address the issue of excessive zeros in the dependent variable. 
Further, Table 4 shows that both OLS and Tobit do not pass the RESET functional form test at 
the 5% significance level. Based on the diagnostic and model selection tests, OLS and Tobit 
are therefore given less weight in evaluating our results. However, we report the results for 
these two estimation methods as they are the most popular in previous studies applying the KK 
model (See Table A1 in the Appendix).  
                                                          
6 The HPC test is so named because it builds on the approach of the P and C tests of non-nested hypotheses, 
proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981), and allows for heteroskedasticity. 
7 Hong Kong was transferred to China on 1 July 1997, after having been ruled for 156 years by the UK. 
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As noted in section 5, the LH model is nested in the ET2T model, with the former imposing 
the restriction  = 0, i.e., the mechanisms generating the zeros and positive FDI values are 
uncorrelated. The LR test reported in Table 4 does not reject this restriction, favouring LH over 
ET2T. PPML assumes the mechanisms generating the zeros and positive FDI values are the 
same. However, the HPC test cannot choose between LH and PPML, or between ET2T and 
PPML. Therefore, we primarily draw conclusions based on both LH and PPML. For 
comparison, we present empirical results from the other estimation methods to show the degree 
of agreement or conflict between the different methods. We do not report results from ET2T 
because they are very similar to LH. For all the tests, we control for source and host country 
fixed effects (FEs) and year FEs. 
In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered by non-directed pairs, i.e., by distance, 
to account for within-pair correlation or heteroskedasticity. Failure to control for this can lead 
to understated standard errors, and overstated levels of statistical significance with low p-values 
(Cameron & Miller, 2015).  
 
6.1. Results without controlling for country fixed effects 
Before discussing the main regression results, we first report results without controlling 
for source and host country FEs (but retaining year FEs) , as several papers applying the KK 
model exclude country FEs, e.g., Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003), Davies (2008), and 
Stack, Ravishankar, and Pentecost (2015). Results are reported in Table 5.  
Estimated coefficients from OLS and Tobit are considerably larger than from PPML and 
LH because the latter two estimation methods assume an exponential function rather than a 
linear function of the dependent variable. Although not shown in the tables of results, the 
quantitative marginal effects from alternative estimation methods are considerably different, 
even between PPML and LH. Therefore, in the discussion we focus mainly on the direction of 
impact and level of statistical significance. 
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As can be seen from Table 5, the sum of the host and source countries’ GDPs (SumGDP) 
positively affects FDI in all equations, which supports the KK model’s predictions for 
horizontal FDI. The effect of the square of GDP differences (GDPdif_sq) on horizontal FDI is 
negative, as predicted, but is not statistically significant when estimated by PPML and LH (for 
the amount equation), in contrast to the significant effects for OLS and Tobit. However, 
GDPdif_sq does have a significant negative effect in the participation equation for LH. The 
host country’s investment costs (Investcost_h), predicted to be negative for both horizontal and 
vertical FDI, is also not statistically significant in both PPML and LH (amount) estimations, 
but has a statistically significant negative effect in the participation equation for LH.  
The results for the key variables that have opposite-signed predicted effects on vertical 
compared to horizontal FDI support the view that vertical FDI is more strongly represented in 
intra-Asian FDI. Specifically, trade costs to the host country (Tradecost_h) have a negative 
impact and differences in skilled-labour endowments (SKdif) have a positive impact, consistent 
with the KK model’s predictions for vertical FDI. Other factors predicted to specifically affect 
vertical FDI are the interaction between income and skill difference (GDPSK) and trade costs 
to source countries (Tradecost_h), and these both have statistically significant negative effects. 
The interaction between trade cost to the host country and skill difference (TradeSK) has 
the opposite sign to the theory in all equations, but this effect is less precisely estimated, in line 
with the weak empirical evidence reported by Carr et al. (2001). Other variables with 
statistically significant effects consistent with their expected impacts are distance, GDP 
difference, and common language.  
Apart from GDPdif_sq, these results, without controlling for country FEs, are consistent 
with the KK model’s predictions, i.e. there is empirical evidence for both horizontal and 





6.2. Results controlling for country fixed effects 
Results controlling for country and year FEs are presented in Table 6. Controlling for 
country FEs can reduce omitted variables bias related to source or host countries’ 
characteristics that are not captured by the variables in the model, such as economic policies, 
culture, infrastructure and political stability. Carr et al. (2001) control for host country FEs 
only, as the source country is always the US in their sample, and find that the signs of the 
coefficients of interest are robust to the inclusion of FEs. The inclusion of source and host 
country FEs and year FEs in Table 6 follows the approach adopted by Braconier, Norbäck, and 
Urban (2005) who apply the KK model to analyse determinants of FDI in different groups of 
countries. Apart from OLS and Tobit, which are inappropriate estimation methods according 
to our diagnostic and model selection tests, the results for the other estimation methods reported 
in Table 6 are not consistent with many of the KK model’s predictions.  
First, SumGDP has a negative impact on FDI with PPML and in the outcome equation of 
the LH model, although its statistical significance is more marginal. In addition, GDPdif_sq 
has a positive impact on FDI with PPML and in the outcome equation of the LH model, 
contradicting the inverted U-shaped relationship between the amount of FDI and difference in 
country size predicted by the KK model. Interestingly, the signs of these two variables in the 
participation equation of the LH model are consistent with the predictions for horizontal FDI. 
However, the participation equation models whether positive FDI is observed between the pair; 
it does not tell us anything about the relationship between the amount of FDI and country size, 
as predicted by the KK model.  
It is worth noting that most previous studies applying the KK model find empirical 
evidence for horizontal FDI based on these variables. Our results are the opposite, but are 
similar to what Kristjánsdóttir (2010) finds in the case of inward FDI stock in Iceland. 
However, Kristjánsdóttir (2010) does not control for country or time FEs in her regression. 
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This feature and the relatively small sample size (78 observations from a panel from 1989 to 
1999) may have affected the conclusions on the CMM specification and the KK model. 
Additionally, in one of the robustness checks in Waldkirch (2011) study applying the KK 
model to inward FDI in Mexico, the regression controlling for country FEs (Table 9, column 
(5)) also shows statistically significant effects for SumGDP and GDPdif_sq that are opposite 
in sign to the KK predictions, although the discussion does not draw attention to these results.  
Although opposite to the theory predictions, the signs of sumGDP and GDPdif_sq may, to 
some extent, signal vertical FDI. The KK model predicts vertical FDI to be highest when the 
source country is small and skilled-labour abundant. In this case, total income of the two 
countries (sumGDP) may not be very large while the squared differences in country size 
(GDPdif_sq) is large. Therefore, the results that sumGDP negatively affects FDI and 
GDPdif_sq encourages FDI are consistent with the predictions for vertical FDI.  
In contrast to the above two predictors for horizontal FDI, the coefficients of variables 
affecting vertical FDI follow the theory in several equations. In particular, GDPSK, the 
interaction between country size differences and skilled-labour abundance differences, has a 
negative impact, although this is statistically significant only at the 10% level for PPML. Its 
coefficients are also negative in all other equations. Similarly, trade costs to the source country 
(Tradecost_s) with LH, and trade costs to the host country (Tradecost_h) with PPML, have 
statistically significant negative effects (at the 1% level) on intra-Asian FDI.  
Whereas skill differences (SKdif) have significant positive effects on FDI for models 
without fixed effects in Table 5, the point estimates for the SKdif coefficient becomes negative 
but is no longer statistically significant when allowing for country FEs in Table 6. Indeed,  
Lankhuizen (2014) argues against distinguishing between horizontal and vertical FDI on the 
basis of the coefficient on SKdif because the host country’s skill level can have a positive 
impact on both types of FDI due to the need for absorptive capacity to attract FDI and for 
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technology transfer. Using skill difference further implies a strong prediction (coefficients of 
equal absolute value but opposite sign) for the impact of source and host countries’ variables 
for labour endowment (SK_s and SK_h). Although the results with fixed effects are less clear-
cut, based on the variables that are statistically significant, vertical FDI still appears to be the 
dominant type between Asian countries.8 This is different from the finding in many previous 
papers, such as Blonigen et al. (2003) and Stack et al. (2015), that horizontal FDI is the 
dominant type and there is little or no empirical evidence for vertical FDI. The different 
conclusion may be partly because those studies focus on developed countries only.  
Besides the differences in some of the results with and without controlling for country FEs, 
a number of determinants of intra-Asian FDI are consistent in terms of the coefficients’ signs 
and significance levels across Tables 5 and 6. To be specific, whereas distance is found to have 
a significant negative impact on FDI in all equations, GDP difference and common spoken 
language have significant positive effects. Hence, intra-Asian FDI is encouraged when source 
countries are bigger than host countries and when the two countries share a common spoken 
language. This result suggests there is no evidence for the Lucas Paradox in intra-Asian FDI. 
Furthermore, a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the square of GDP difference 
in columns (7) and (8) in Table 6 suggests that the relationship between GDP difference and 
FDI is not the inverted U-shape predicted by the KK model. Instead, the pattern is simply that 
the larger the source country, the more FDI flows to the host country.  
A positive impact of common spoken language is in line with the finding of  Kim et al. 
(2015). However, whereas Kim et al. (2015) find that language can affect investors’ decisions, 
common spoken language does not have a statistically significant impact on the participation 
decision in our LH results (in Table 6, column (10)). It has a positive and significant effect in 
                                                          
8 Investment costs in the host country surprisingly have a marginally significant positive impact on the probability 
to invest but a negative impact on the amount of investment. 
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the amount equation (column (9)) only. Similar to common language, contiguity has a positive 
effect on the amount of FDI but does not have a statistically significant impact on participation 
decisions. Empirical evidence for contiguity is weak since its coefficient is statistically 
significant only in column (9) and only at the 10% significance level. 
Interestingly, existence of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) has a positive impact on the 
decision to undertake FDI, but any impact on the amount of FDI is imprecisely estimated in 
the LH model. Note that the results on BIT for PPML and LH contradict each other. Many 
recent empirical papers on trade and FDI, such as Bruno, Campos, Estrin, and Tian (2017) and 
Berger, Busse, Nunnenkamp, and Roy (2013), apply PPML and derive conclusions from this 
estimation method without any model selection tests. If we solely relied on PPML, our 
conclusion on BIT would be that a bilateral investment treaty deters intra-Asian FDI, with 
significance at the 1% significance level. However, the opposite result for this variable for LH 
emphasizes the importance of using alternative estimation methods to draw robust conclusions. 
We give more weight to the LH results in this case as this method allows the mechanisms 
generating zero and positive FDI to be different. Finally, having a common colonizer post 1945 
is often found to have a positive impact on FDI (Eichengreen & Tong, 2006; Liebscher, Christl, 
Mooslechner, & Ritzberger-Grünwald, 2007); however, in our results, the effect of this variable 
on intra-Asian FDI is not statistically significant. 
 
7. Robustness checks 
The main regression results in our analysis (Table 6) do not support the KK model’s 
predictions for key variables such as total GDP and skill difference, although there is still 
evidence for vertical FDI as discussed above. In this section, we conduct sensitivity tests to see 
if the conclusions remain unchanged with a different sample, different model specifications, 




7.1. A smaller sample 
One of the most significant differences in our study compared to previous studies applying 
the KK model is that we include data for all possible country pairs within a group of countries. 
As a consequence, around 70% of FDI stocks are zero as these country pairs do not invest in 
each other. Other studies that apply the KK model consider only pairs of countries that have 
positive FDI in at least one year over their study periods. The differences in our results may 
result from a sample overly dominated by zero values. To explore this possibility, Table 7 
reports results with the same sampling method used in previous studies, i.e., including only 
pairs of countries that have at least one year of positive FDI stock over the period of analysis. 
The number of observations is reduced from 9531 to 3703. We repeat the same model selection 
and diagnostic testing process with this sample, and PPML and LH are still the preferred 
estimators. 
The results in Table 7 are almost identical to Table 6 in terms of variables’ signs and 
significance levels, except for the participation equation of the LH model in which fewer 
variables are statistically significant. Accordingly, our results do not appear to be due to 
different sampling criteria. With or without the zero pairs, vertical FDI is still the dominant 
type in intra-Asian FDI and the KK model predictions for key variables do not hold. Therefore, 
in the following sensitivity tests we include all possible pairs, which maximizes the number of 
observations.  
 
7.2.  Davies’s (2008) specification 
Whereas results in Table 6 suggest that vertical FDI is the dominant type between Asian 
countries, the key variables in the CMM specification are either not statistically significant or 
have signs opposite to what is expected. In addition, many previous studies find evidence only 
for horizontal FDI (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Davies (2008) claims this is because the 
CMM specification is too restrictive to identify vertical FDI.  
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When SKdif < 0, i.e., the host country is more skilled-labour abundant than the source 
country, FDI is horizontal and a decreasing function of the absolute size of SKdif. However, if 
SKdif > 0, horizontal FDI can arise when source countries are more or less skill-abundant than 
the host country, and FDI can be a combination of horizontal and vertical types. Because of 
this lack of symmetry, Davies estimates the model separately for subsets of the data with 
positive skill difference and negative skill difference. Table 8 shows regression results for 
positive and negative SKdif separately, with SKdif_sq as an additional explanatory variable. 
When SKdif < 0, vertical FDI does not happen, so the regression for SKdif < 0 is mainly to see 
if there is support for horizontal FDI.9 Therefore, in Table 8, we omit the expected sign column 
entry for vertical FDI when SKdif < 0. In contrast to the CMM specification, the expected signs 
for SKdif and SKdif_sq when SKdif < 0 follow the Blonigen et al. (2003) and Davies (2008) 
argument that when SKdif decreases in the negative range, it diverges from zero and reduces 
horizontal FDI. This leads the coefficients of SKdif and SKdif_sq to be positive and negative 
respectively if SKdif < 0. The separation of the sample into two groups based on the value of 
skill difference is also adopted by Blonigen et al. (2003) and Kristjánsdóttir (2010).10 
Again, for both the positive and negative SKdif specifications, the results do not support 
the KK model’s predictions for key variables. For the negative SKdif specification, SumGDP 
and GDPdif_sq still have unexpected signs and are highly significant. For the positive SKdif 
specification, the coefficients on these variables are not statistically significant. Predictions by 
Davies (2008) on SKdif and SKdif_sq are not met either. For the negative SKdif specification, 
SKdif_sq has the expected sign and is significant in the LH estimation, but the coefficient for 
SKdif Is not statistically significant. The coefficients on these variables are also not significant 
for the positive SKdif specification in the LH estimation. Davies’s (2008) results on the 
                                                          
9 Markusen and Maskus (2002) also test this prediction but in a different specification and without SKdif_sq. 
10 We do not present results from OLS and Tobit estimation to save space and because, based on the model 
specification and diagnostic tests, these are also not appropriate estimation methods. 
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relationship between SKdif and FDI are based on regressions that do not control for either time 
FEs or country FEs. This is similar to our results that do not control for country FEs (Table 5), 
which support the CMM specification and the KK model predictions in general.  
 
7.3. Braconier et al.’s (2005) specification  
The diversity in empirical results testing the CMM specification of the KK model 
motivated Braconier et al. (2005) to construct a different specification (labelled BNU), with 
new variables SIZESQ, SKILL, and SIZE (to replace GDPdif_sq, SKdif, and GDPdif, 
respectively), based on geometric features of the Edgeworth box diagram from Markusen’s 
(2002) simulation results.11 However, the roles and expected signs of these variables are the 
same as the original variables in Carr et al. (2001), so, for ease of comparison with the previous 
tables, we use both sets of variable names in tabulating the results.  
In order to apply the BNU specification, we use data from the ILO on the number of skilled 
and unskilled workers. This is also the most common data source for labour endowments for 
empirical studies of the KK model, although, for our 31 Asian countries, it leads to a lower 
number of observations than available data on tertiary education. Results based on the BNU 
specification in the case of our Asian sample are shown in Table 9. OLS results in Table 9 
support the KK model predictions for a number of variables including SumGDP, SKILL (the 
replacement for SKdif) and TradeSK. This matches BNU’s conclusion in their study, based on 
OLS and weighted least squares (WLS) estimates for a sample containing 56 source countries 
and 85 host countries from 1986 to 1998. Moreover, Braconier et al. (2005) also control for 
both time and country FEs. However, our results for all the other estimation methods for corner 
solution outcomes (Tobit, PPML, and LH) do not support their predictions. In particular, almost 
                                                          
11 SIZE_h is defined as (s_h2 + u_h2)0.5, and SKILL_h as s_h/u_h, where s_h and u_h are the source country’s 
shares in total (source + host) endowments of high-skilled and low-skilled labour, respectively (Braconier et al., 
2005, Table 1). 
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all the basic KK variables (SumGDP, SIZESQ (for GDPdif_sq), GDPSK, and SKILL (for 
SKdif)) are not statistically significant. Furthermore, the replacement of GDPdif by the SIZE 
variable leads to no statistically significant impact of this variable on FDI in all equations. 
Meanwhile, the results for other variables, which are not affected by the new measures of 
Braconier et al. (2005), continue to show similar impacts as in Table 6.  
The KK model predicts a relationship between the relative income of the source country 
compared to the host country and FDI. In BNU, the relative country size relies purely on 
geometrical features of the Edgeworth box in Markusen (2002) and is calculated by ratios of 
labour endowments. It does not capture the total income or purchasing power of the country in 
monetary terms. This may help explain why all the empirical results from models for corner 




The KK model has been widely used in the FDI literature in the last two decades in order 
to identify horizontal and vertical FDI empirically. The majority of studies focus on a group of 
developed countries, such as the OECD, or on inward and outward FDI for a single economy. 
This is the first study to apply the KK model to intra-Asian data to examine the determinants 
of FDI and to find the dominant type of intra-Asian FDI. The KK model includes specific 
difference, interaction and squared variables that distinguish it from previous theories on FDI. 
This is also the first study to attempt to estimate the KK model using a comprehensive set of 
alternative estimation methods for dealing with corner solution outcomes and to perform model 
selection tests to find the most appropriate estimation method.  
Our empirical results, based on appropriate estimation methods that deal with zero values 
(especially PPML and LH), show that the coefficients of the KK-specific variables (SumGDP, 
GDPdif_sq, TradeSK, and SKdif) either have signs opposite to what is predicted by the theory 
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or are statistically insignificant when country and time fixed effects are included in the fitted 
models. To some extent, our empirical findings signal that vertical FDI is the dominant type of 
FDI between Asian countries, although the key variable to distinguish horizontal and vertical 
FDI (SKdif) has an unexpected sign but is also not statistically significant when country fixed 
effects are included.  
As our study is the first study including all possible pairs among a group of countries to 
explain the zero FDI part of the KK model, we also estimate models based on the same sample 
selection methods as in previous studies, but our conclusions remain unchanged. Through a 
variety of sensitivity tests with different choices of samples, model specifications, and proxies 
for skilled-labour endowments, we do not find empirical evidence in support of the main 
predictions of the KK model for both forms of FDI. The non-monotonic and nonlinear 
relationships that the KK model predicts based on its numerical simulation results appear not 
to be supported empirically in the case of intra-Asian FDI. On the other hand, a number of 
factors are found to have a significant impact on the volume of FDI between Asian countries. 
These are distance, trade costs to both source and host countries, the GDP difference between 
source and host country, and a common spoken language. Existence of a bilateral investment 
treaty also has a positive impact on FDI decisions but any subsequent effect on the amount of 
investment is imprecisely estimated.  
Overall, our results suggest that future research should consider alternative models of FDI 
(e.g., gravity-based and other models). Our results also highlight the importance of checking 
the robustness of results to the inclusion of fixed effects and alternative estimation methods 
that deal specifically with corner solution outcomes reflected in large numbers of zeros in the 
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Figure 1: FDI inflows to Asia, by region, 2001-2012 (%) 
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Variables: Definitions and hypotheses 
Note: Empty cells in columns of expected signs denote little or no expected impact. ‘HOR’ and ‘VER’ denote 
horizontal and vertical FDI, respectively. 
 
  
No Variables Explanation Expected signs 
HOR VER 
Basic KK variables 
1 SumGDP Total income: GDP_s + GDP_h + 
 
2 GDPdif_sq Square of difference in income: 
(GDP_s – GDP_h)2 
  
3 GDPSK Interaction between difference in income and 
in skilled-labour endowments: 
(GDP_s – GDP_h)  (SK_s – SK_h) 
 

4 Tradecost_s Trade cost to the source country   
5 Tradecost_h Trade cost to the host country +  
6 SKdif Difference in skilled-labour endowments: 
SK_s – SK_h 
 + 
7 TradeSK Interaction between trade costs to the host 
country and squared difference in skilled-
labour endowments: Tradecost_h  (SK_s – 
SK_h)2 
 
8   Investcost_h Investment costs in the host country    
9 Dist Distance  +/  
Additional  variables 
10 GDPdif Difference in income: 
GDP_s – GDP_h 
+/ +/ 
11 BIT 1 for pairs that have active in-force bilateral 
investment treaties 
+ + 
12 ComLang 1 for pairs that have a common spoken language + + 
13 Contig 1 for pairs that have a common border + + 






Table 3  
Data sources   
Data           Source 
FDI stocks Million 2010 USD UNCTAD 
Nominal GDP  Million USD World Bank & IMF 
Real GDP  Million 2010 USD World Bank & IMF 
Tertiary enrolment  %, [0, 100] World Bank 
Proportion of the labour force that is 
skilled 
Ratio, [0, 1] ILO 
Investment costs = 100 – Investment 
Freedom Index 
Index, [0, 100] The Heritage Foundation 
 
Trade costs = 100 –Trade Freedom 
Index 
Index, [0, 100] The Heritage Foundation 
Bilateral investment treaty 0-1 dummy UNCTAD 
Distance 1000 Km CEPII 
Common language, contiguity, 
common colony 
0-1 dummies CEPII 
Country list: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, South Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Lebanon, Macao, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, 




Model comparison and specification test results: p-values  
 
 
OLS Tobit PPML LH ET2T Conclusion 
RESET test 0.000 0.000 0.819 0.412 0.047 PPML, LH are not rejected at 
the 5% significance level 
HPC test 
      
Tobit versus ET2T  0.004   0.261 ET2T is preferred to Tobit 
 
Tobit versus LH  0.003  0.285  LH is preferred to Tobit 
 




0.192 Neither PPML nor ET2T 
preferred 




Neither PPML nor LH  
preferred 
LR test  
      
LH versus ET2T 
   
0.333 LH is preferred to ET2T, 





Results without country fixed effects 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 HOR VER OLS Tobit PPML LH 
      Amount Part 
SumGDP +  2694.690*** 4703.331*** 0.480*** 0.736*** 1.153*** 
   (586.246) (352.294) (0.038) (0.212) (0.101) 
GDPdif_sq   339.874*** 547.567*** 0.011 0.051 0.161*** 
   (103.486) (44.869) (0.008) (0.038) (0.017) 
GDPSK   1650.162*** 1692.071*** 0.356*** 0.320*** 0.063 
   (620.759) (592.940) (0.094) (0.121) (0.120) 
Tradecost_s   38.813*** 146.157*** 0.107*** 0.075*** 0.020*** 
   (9.481) (28.166) (0.017) (0.009) (0.004) 
Tradecost_h +  28.680*** 59.262*** 0.027* 0.040*** 0.006 
   (8.063) (22.325) (0.014) (0.009) (0.004) 
SKdif  + 1314.471
** 3786.349*** 1.937*** 1.432*** 0.506*** 
   (662.005) (1340.229) (0.369) (0.308) (0.140) 
TradeSK   37.508 167.924
*** 0.028 0.034** 0.033*** 
   (36.993) (51.980) (0.024) (0.016) (0.009) 
Investcost_h   1.974 27.017* 0.007 0.002 0.008*** 
   (6.788) (15.192) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) 
Dist +/  333.035*** 1137.307*** 0.269*** 0.456*** 0.190*** 
   (58.704) (173.991) (0.068) (0.057) (0.026) 
GDPdif +/ +/ 74.296 453.305** 0.150*** 0.111** 0.144*** 
   (170.136) (195.331) (0.033) (0.045) (0.027) 
BIT + + 1016.473*** 1312.449** 0.198 0.125 0.469*** 
   (338.473) (640.525) (0.286) (0.235) (0.104) 
Contiguity + + 1389.474* 966.116 0.019 0.048 0.005 
   (750.972) (1326.418) (0.543) (0.395) (0.231) 
ComLang + + 906.024* 3078.175*** 1.193*** 1.101*** 0.266* 
   (492.745) (992.542) (0.289) (0.286) (0.141) 
ComCol + + 17.734 604.015 0.224 0.404 0.197 
   (252.487) (785.175) (0.420) (0.339) (0.150) 
Constant   2562.836*** 1573.558 9.876*** 7.469*** 0.523** 
   (668.323) (1454.723) (0.567) (0.515) (0.223) 
N   9531 9531 9531 9531 
Log pseudo likelihood 92743.48 32266.24 7681712.07 22121.33 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ‘Amount’ and ‘Part’ refer to the amount 
decision and participation decision, respectively. ‘HOR’ and ‘VER’ denote horizontal and vertical FDI, 





Results with country fixed effects 
   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 HOR VER OLS Tobit PPML LH 
      Amount Part 
SumGDP +  3827.364*** 2758.204*** 0.175** 0.205* 0.917*** 
   (488.001) (586.730) (0.069) (0.108) (0.351) 
GDPdif_sq   474.756*** 405.117*** 0.017
*** 0.022* 0.089** 
   (57.772) (56.753) (0.005) (0.012) (0.038) 
GDPSK   2481.519*** 2161.680*** 0.118* 0.151 0.188 
   (690.567) (795.221) (0.071) (0.136) (0.200) 
Tradecost_s   9.017
*** 6.715 0.013 0.020*** 0.003 
   (3.419) (15.823) (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) 
Tradecost_h +  5.527 26.332* 0.025*** 0.006 0.000 
   (5.731) (15.966) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
SKdif  + 364.806 1101.726 0.311 0.209 0.051 
   (293.084) (1538.507) (0.649) (0.579) (0.405) 
TradeSK   64.201
* 69.654 0.039*** 0.014 0.011 
   (34.254) (56.256) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) 
Investcost_h   2.134 25.784
** 0.003 0.008* 0.006** 
   (3.350) (10.763) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Dist +/  222.896*** 1026.150*** 0.290*** 0.493*** 0.286*** 
   (52.121) (163.191) (0.043) (0.056) (0.036) 
GDPdif +/ +/ 195.666** 467.230*** 0.228*** 0.211*** 0.207*** 
   (97.149) (157.738) (0.055) (0.071) (0.077) 
BIT + + 702.147** 133.894 0.282*** 0.011 0.517*** 
   (314.293) (564.791) (0.106) (0.175) (0.129) 
Contiguity + + 599.690 98.582 0.375 0.548* 0.117 
   (636.698) (943.457) (0.268) (0.285) (0.265) 
ComLang + + 1514.446** 2813.118*** 0.678*** 0.614*** 0.141 
   (637.492) (1031.232) (0.156) (0.229) (0.202) 
ComCol + + 527.423* 201.686 0.155 0.478 0.286 
   (306.629) (873.800) (0.216) (0.337) (0.207) 
Constant   238.812 11624.107*** 1.618 5.373*** 2.129*** 
   (497.625) (2984.433) (1.112) (0.939) (0.492) 
N   9531 9531 9531 9531 
Log pseudo likelihood -91458.04 -31226.73 1679811.78 19790.86 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ‘Amount’ and ‘Part’ refer to the amount 
decision and participation decision, respectively. ‘HOR’ and ‘VER’ denote horizontal and vertical FDI, 





Results for pairs with at least one year of positive FDI 
 HOR VER OLS Tobit PPML LH 
      Amount Part 
SumGDP +  2740.532*** 2209.512*** 0.172*** 0.205* 0.052 
   (756.469) (759.703) (0.065) (0.108) (0.242) 
GDPdif_sq   425.244*** 388.864*** 0.013
*** 0.022* 0.020 
   (60.093) (59.483) (0.004) (0.012) (0.023) 
GDPSK   2303.586*** 2053.656*** 0.177** 0.151 0.200 
   (678.736) (665.024) (0.070) (0.136) (0.203) 
Tradecost_s   36.362
*** 18.179 0.011 0.020*** 0.009 
   (12.138) (18.378) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) 
Tradecost_h +  22.932* 38.095** 0.023*** 0.006 0.007 
   (11.741) (15.636) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
SKdif  + 1214.219 3010.184* 0.265 0.209 0.846 
   (1032.874) (1708.232) (0.658) (0.579) (0.920) 
TradeSK   53.987 58.687 0.036
*** 0.014 0.010 
   (37.712) (41.418) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Investcost_h   15.764 32.765
*** 0.004 0.008* 0.013*** 
   (9.645) (11.735) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Dist +/  401.975*** 680.946*** 0.246*** 0.493*** 0.237*** 
   (114.355) (121.854) (0.035) (0.057) (0.037) 
GDPdif +/ +/ 940.061** 980.674** 0.231*** 0.211*** 0.161 
   (383.447) (385.285) (0.053) (0.071) (0.125) 
BIT + + 677.563 570.482 0.284*** 0.011 0.292** 
   (582.630) (582.327) (0.099) (0.175) (0.133) 
Contiguity + + 352.603 386.926 0.343 0.548* 0.063 
   (1082.463) (1045.135) (0.255) (0.286) (0.226) 
ComLang + + 1659.874* 1930.708* 0.554*** 0.614*** 0.176 
   (976.610) (1002.183) (0.156) (0.229) (0.213) 
ComCol + + 667.153 518.927 0.063 0.478 0.017 
   (700.639) (764.916) (0.200) (0.338) (0.203) 
Constant   2635.206 1159.616 8.818*** 5.373*** 1.729*** 
   (3390.636) (1736.349) (0.749) (0.940) (0.511) 
N   3703 3703 3703 3703 
Log pseudo likelihood 36741.62 30075.00 1342424.72 18359.88 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ‘Amount’ and ‘Part’ refer to the amount 
decision and participation decision, respectively. ‘HOR’ and ‘VER’ denote horizontal and vertical FDI, 




Results based on Davies’ (2008) specification 
  Negative SKdif Positive SKdif 
 HOR PPML LH HOR VER PPML LH 
   Amount Part    Amount Part 
SumGDP + 0.821*** 0.650*** 1.022** +  0.072 0.093 1.063** 
  (0.272) (0.202) (0.448)   (0.076) (0.161) (0.537) 
GDPdif_sq  0.049
* 0.030*** 0.101**   0.010
** 0.006 0.132** 
  (0.025) (0.010) (0.050)   (0.004) (0.017) (0.055) 
GDPSK  0.058 0.051 0.197   0.110 0.156 0.963*** 
  (0.192) (0.238) (0.318)   (0.090) (0.239) (0.325) 
Tradecost_s  0.024*** 0.008 0.004   0.002 0.030** 0.013** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)   (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) 
Tradecost_h + 0.001 0.005 0.018** +  0.020*** 0.010 0.004 
  (0.020) (0.011) (0.009)   (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
SKdif + 1.240 2.252 1.574  + 2.996** 1.490 1.396 
  (1.601) (1.724) (1.126)   (1.204) (1.471) (1.452) 
SKdif_sq  2.694 7.326** 0.435  + 5.105
*** 2.236 2.448 
  (5.041) (3.318) (1.992)   (1.827) (1.882) (2.685) 
TradeSK  0.069 0.279
*** 0.020   0.012 0.017 0.012 
  (0.150) (0.083) (0.054)   (0.017) (0.019) (0.027) 
Investcost_h  0.014
** 0.002 0.019***   0.003 0.010* 0.006* 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)   (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Dist +/ 0.357*** 0.520*** 0.307*** +/  0.262*** 0.460*** 0.391*** 
  (0.072) (0.092) (0.040)   (0.036) (0.055) (0.046) 
GDPdif +/ 0.388** 0.393** 0.375*** +/ +/ 0.283*** 0.272*** 0.121 
  (0.163) (0.183) (0.136)   (0.068) (0.089) (0.403) 
BIT + 0.104 0.176 0.324** + + 0.331*** 0.154 0.738*** 
  (0.160) (0.235) (0.151)   (0.119) (0.196) (0.182) 
Contiguity + 0.214 1.151*** 0.087 + + 0.481** 0.293 0.433 
  (0.583) (0.445) (0.311)   (0.235) (0.397) (0.326) 
ComLang + 0.113 0.076 0.042 + + 0.842*** 0.890*** 0.086 
  (0.308) (0.342) (0.235)   (0.130) (0.239) (0.252) 
ComCol + 0.051 0.905* 0.431* + + 0.134 0.602* 0.360 
  (0.376) (0.491) (0.258)   (0.240) (0.351) (0.253) 
Constant  2.517 3.348*** 1.199*   11.984*** 8.734*** 2.326*** 
  (1.838) (1.034) (0.676)   (1.065) (0.872) (0.649) 
N  4806 4806   4725 4725 
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
572454.89 7587.60   744809.
18 
11485.80 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ‘Amount’ and ‘Part’ refer to the amount decision 
and participation decision, respectively. ‘HOR’ and ‘VER’ denote horizontal and vertical FDI, respectively. Source and host 




Results based on Braconier et al.’s (2005) specification 
 HOR VER OLS Tobit PPML LH 
      Amount Part 
SumGDP +  1950.188*** 324.430 0.210 0.223 0.356 
   (625.979) (1011.698) (0.255) (0.359) (0.374) 
GDPdif_sq   571.898 469.379 0.254 0.984 0.490 
(SIZESQ)   (814.494) (1968.515) (0.488) (0.771) (0.496) 
GDPSK   611.632 1052.158 0.097 0.018 0.070 
   (413.996) (670.385) (0.092) (0.188) (0.143) 
Tradecost_s   4.960 13.708 0.030*** 0.020*** 0.009** 
   (4.078) (13.633) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) 
Tradecost_h +  0.311 6.399 0.014** 0.002 0.003 
   (4.241) (11.259) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
SKdif  + 703.615
*** 847.457** 0.006 0.093 0.036 
(SKILL)   (253.055) (351.668) (0.066) (0.099) (0.071) 
TradeSK   0.491** 0.679** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 
   (0.217) (0.286) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investcost_h   8.332
** 35.303*** 0.004 0.008** 0.010*** 
   (3.906) (10.111) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Dist +/  273.063*** 847.036*** 0.245*** 0.444*** 0.281*** 
   (50.553) (125.725) (0.047) (0.060) (0.041) 
GDPdif +/ +/ 553.064 623.456 0.049 1.118 0.427 
(SIZE)   (1729.101) (3885.939) (0.865) (1.247) (0.838) 
BIT + + 789.806*** 144.641 0.187 0.033 0.525*** 
   (296.608) (494.194) (0.160) (0.193) (0.146) 
Contiguity + + 317.954 1528.466 0.165 0.718* 0.396 
   (687.605) (933.780) (0.288) (0.402) (0.340) 
ComLang + + 521.837 785.493 0.652*** 0.552** 0.091 
   (353.726) (710.911) (0.247) (0.265) (0.207) 
ComCol + + 291.617 675.341 0.207 0.348 0.499** 
   (308.047) (857.066) (0.296) (0.392) (0.238) 
Constant   827.403 11670.030*** 3.275* 5.691*** 2.691*** 
   (3551.807) (3332.490) (1.979) (1.007) (0.682) 
N   7259 7259 7259 7259 
Log pseudo likelihood 67735.48 23572.93 1228429.28 15196.30 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ‘Amount’ and ‘Part’ refer to the amount 
decision and participation decision, respectively. ‘HOR’ and ‘VER’ denote horizontal and vertical FDI, 





Appendix – Table A1 
Summary of empirical applications of the KK model  
 




Carr et al. (2001)  US, 1986-1994 OLS, WLS, Tobit CMM KK 
Markusen and 
Maskus (2001) 
US, 1986-1994 OLS, WLS, Tobit CMM Mixed 
Markusen and 
Maskus (2002)  
US, 1986-1994 WLS, Tobit CMM Mixed 
Blonigen et al. (2003) US, 1986-1994  
OECD, 1982-1992 
OLS, Tobit Modified CMM HOR 
Gao (2003)  China, 1992  N/A CMM KK 
Yeaple (2003)  US, 1994 OLS Own  KK 
Blonigen and Davies 
(2004) 
US, 1980-1999 OLS, FE  
 
Modified CMM HOR 
Blonigen and Wang 
(2004)  
US, 1970-1999 N/A CMM Mixed 
Egger and 
Pfaffermayr (2004)  
OECD, 1982-1997 FE CMM KK 
Braconier et al. 
(2005)  
56 source and 85 host 
countries, 1986-1998 
OLS, WLS Own KK 
Baltagi, Egger, and 
Pfaffermayr (2007)  
US, 1989-1999 Spatial GMM Own KK 
Davies (2008)  US, 1986-1994  
OECD, 1982-1992 
OLS Modified CMM KK 
Mariel et al. (2009)  OECD, 1982-2003 Time-varying 
coefficient model 
CMM KK 
Kiyoyasu (2009)  Japan and US, 1989-2002 GMM CMM  Mixed 
Kristjánsdóttir (2010)  Iceland, 1989-1999 OLS, Tobit Modified CMM HOR 
Waldkirch (2011)  Mexico, 1994-2000 Tobit Own KK 




GMM, WLS, Tobit CMM Mixed 
Kristjánsdóttir (2012) Iceland, 1989-1999 OLS, Tobit CMM  Mixed 
Chellaraj et al. (2013)  Singapore, 1984-2007 Tobit,  CMM Mixed 
Lankhuizen (2014) OECD, 1985-1992 WLS Modified CMM No support 
for KK 
Stack et al. (2015)  Europe, 1996-2007 Stochastic frontier 
analysis  
Modified CMM HOR 
Dixon and Haslam 
(2016) 
Latin America, 1990-2008 GMM, LSDV CMM Mixed 
Notes: CMM = Carr et al. (2001) specification, FE = fixed effects, GMM = generalized method of moments, 
LSDV = least squares dummy variables 
Empirical evidence for the KK model: KK = Support for both vertical and horizontal FDI, and thus the KK 
model; HOR = Support for horizontal FDI only; Mixed = Support for the KK model in some cases but not in 
others, e.g., the KK model’s predictions are true only for some industries or some specific groups of countries. 
In other cases, results support horizontal FDI only. 
 
